Temporary Migration, Labour Supply and Welfare by Ahsan, S. Quamrul
WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS





  Department of Economics    ________________________
 U N I V E R S I T Y  OF  B E R G E N 
 












S. Quamrul Ahsan 
Department of Economics 
University of Bergen 
 
e-mail: quamrul.ahsan@econ.uib.no 
                                                 
1This paper was written while the author was visiting Institüt für Finanzwissenschaft at 
Universität  Freiburg  during  September-October,  2006.  The  author  will  like  to  thank 
Professor  Dr.  Bernd  Raffelhüschen  at  Freiburg  for  his  kind  invitation  and  generous 
hospitality. A travel grant from the Meltzerfondet at the University of Bergen is gratefully 
acknowledged.   1 
 Abstract: 
 
This essay addresses the incidence of temporary migration in poor rural economies. The 
methodological view taken here is that temporary or seasonal migration is a strategy of 
self-insurance,  used  largely  by  peasant  households  in  order  to  cope  with  the  risk  of 
unemployment and income loss during agricultural slack seasons. Households typically 
implement the insurance strategy by sending away some of its working members to seek 
urban jobs during slack seasons while the remaining members pursue rural employment. 
This allows for diversification of household slack season income risks to the extent that the 
incomes from rural and urban sources are not fully correlated. The analytical focus of this 
paper is on exploring how household behaviour, especially with respect to labour supply, is 
affected  by  participation  in  seasonal  migration.  The  market  and  income  distributional 
outcomes  of  seasonal  migration  are  also  analysed  in  relation  to  the  corresponding 
outcomes in the counterfactual state of no migration. The following results are obtained.  
 
In the event that the participation in slack season migration is utility/welfare improving, the 
participating households are likely to supply more labour during the post-migration peak 
season, compared to the counterfactual state. The intuition is simple. In an intertemporal 
(i.e., a two season) setting, participation in welfare improving migration in the slack season 
will  allow  households  to  allocate  more  resources  for  consumption  in  the  peak  season. 
Higher consumption leads to higher effort supply via the consumption-effort relationship. 
In  terms  of  the  aggregate/market  outcomes  of  migration,  the  land-owning  (employer) 
households and the peasant households with migrants will experience welfare gains while 
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1.1.  Introduction 
This paper focuses on the role of seasonal migration as a provider of income insurance for 
the  rural  poor.  The  concept  of  insurance  motivated  (rural-to-urban)  migration,  in  the 
context of rural economies, has been widely studied both theoretically and empirically, 
(see, among others, Cox and Jimenez (1992), Hoddinott (1994), Levhari and Stark (1982), 
Lucas and Stark (1985, 1988)) and Chen et al. (2003)
2. The standard problem discussed in 
this literature is that of income risks and consumption smoothing over time. Income from 
agricultural activities is typically subject to vagaries of nature and therefore inherently 
risky. In the absence of standard insurance markets, a means of coping with the income 
risk for a farm family would be to self-insure. A simple mechanism for self-insurance is to 
accumulate savings during good years and run these down during lean years. Such inter-
temporal risk pooling however may not provide adequate/sufficient insurance as harvests 
over  time  tend  to  be  serially  correlated.  An  alternative  would  be  a  scheme  of  mutual 
insurance between two (or more) family members, whereby some family members seek 
employment in urban areas (or in foreign countries) and the remaining members tend the 
home farm. Migration of this type creates potential for risk-spreading/diversification since 
spatial  separation  between  the  home  village  and  the  urban  centre(s),  as  well  as  the 
structural differences between the village and the urban economies imply that earnings 
from these (alternative) sources are not subject to same/common shocks and are therefore 
largely uncorrelated. 
 
In this paper, the insurance approach is adopted to study a special case of the more general 
migration phenomenon discussed above – namely, the incidence of seasonal or temporary 
rural-to-urban  migration.  The  motivation  for  studying  seasonal  migration  lies  in  our 
underlying interest in understanding the broader issue of incidence and consequences of 
rural poverty
3. Below, we draw attention to a number of key issues.  
-  Seasonal  migration  remains  a  major  demographic  phenomenon  that  occurs  with 
unerring regularity during the lean agricultural season in rural societies in most of 
South  Asia.  The  incidence  of  seasonal  migration  is  the  highest  among  peasant 
                                                 
2 Chen et al. model international migration in a non-rural context. We contend that the work by Chen et al. 
remains relevant in the present context as there are strong similarities between the motives for rural-to-urban 
migration as we perceive it and that for international migration as modelled in Chen et al.  
3 The geographic area of interest here is South Asia in general and the Indian subcontinent in particular.   3 
households  who  also  make  up  the  bulk  the  acute  poor,  (see  for  example  Rogaly 
(2002)). 
-  Seasonal migration, as we argue below, is a qualitatively distinct phenomenon and 
different from the standard notion of migration as modelled by Stark et al. (op. cit). 
In  particular,  we  argue  that  seasonal  migration  is  a  key  coping  strategy  open  to 
peasant households faced with the risk of seasonal unemployment. The notion of 
(insurance motivated) migration à la Stark et al., on the other hand, is thought to be a 
response to production risks in agriculture. We argue that employment risks may exist 
independent of production risks, (see section 1.2. for further details).  
 
We  believe  that  this  distinct  nature  of  seasonal  migration  has  strong  implications  for 
understanding the nature of rural poverty as well as for designing poverty policies in the 
context of south Asia. Indeed, demographers have long held that seasonal migration is 
singularly important as a poverty coping instrument in peasant communities, see Rogaly 
(2002) and the references therein. Unfortunately, there is little evidence that the special 
nature of seasonal migration is duly analyzed in the literature. This paper is an effort to fill 
this alleged gap (in the literature). Before we embark on modelling, we present the notion 
of seasonal migration in its appropriate context.  
 
1.2.  The Context 
We begin by stating some facts about agricultural labour markets. The production cycle (or 
the growing season) in traditional agriculture is characterized by a short spell of brisk 
labour intensive activities, (the peak season), during which labour market is tight, followed 
by a period of relative inactivity, (the slack season), see Figure 1. While there are generally 
little or no employment uncertainties in the peak season, many peasant (landless) households 
are  typically  unable  to  secure  agricultural  employment  in  the  low/slack  season  as  labour 
demand  tends  to  be  low  as  well  as  uncertain
4.  Seasonal  migration  takes  the  form  of 
                                                 
4 The onset of peak season coincides with the beginning of harvesting. This is followed by threshing and 
other  harvest  related  activities,  and  often  soil  preparation  and  replanting,  all  of  which  are  peak  season 
activities. We define the mid-point of this season the harvest point. Further, the slack season is thought to be 
a period when there is standing crop in the field with little demand for labour effort. It is implicit in Figure 1 
that the harvesting of a crop is immediately followed by replanting, but in reality there is often a period of 
fallow between harvesting and replanting. In our analysis, the fallow period will also be considered a part of 
slack/low season.    4 
unemployed agricultural workers migrating to urban centres during the slack season to seek 
unskilled/informal jobs, and returning home before the peak season labour market opens up.  
 
Figure 1 
                                     The large arrowheads (         ) indicate harvest points 
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Peasant households and risk coping 
Our focus is on the rural households which own virtually no productive assets other than 
their labour power and survive by selling labour services in a seasonal labour market with 
fluctuating employment opportunities. The problem these households face is the income 
risk stemming form employment uncertainty, especially in the low/slack season. Note the 
qualitative difference between the income risk (a) faced by peasants due to employment 
uncertainty, and (b) that faced by a farmer due to fluctuation in the size of harvest. The 
inter-temporal  structure  of  the  two  risks  is  different  for  the  following  reason:  While 
employment opportunities vary from one season to the next within a production cycle, 
output fluctuation can only occur across harvest points, (i.e., from one cycle to the next), 
(see also Figure 1)
5. The focus in the analytical literature (e.g., Stark et al.) has been on the 
production risk. We will focus exclusively on the employment risk. For peasant families, the 
need for insurance arises as the savings from peak season income typically are inadequate 
to stabilize slack season consumption. For these households, participation in slack season 
migration is a means of diversifying slack season income risks. 
 
 
                                                 
5 Note that employment risks may exist independent of production risks. A peasant worker may not find slack 
season employment, for example, in weeding (at the expected time) simply because the weeding season is 
postponed due to a random weather event, (for example, an unexpected/untimely flooding of crop fields). 
Note further that while an event like this causes workers extreme hardship, it need not affect the size of 
harvest.   5 
Operationalizing seasonal migration 
Consider  a  peasant  household  with  several  working  members.  Given  that  the  individual 
members face high probabilities of full/partial unemployment in slack seasons, a choice open 
to the household is to allocate part of its labour power to the urban labour market, i.e., send 
some members to the city during the low season to seek unskilled jobs, with the option of 
returning home during the peak season when employment opportunities improve.  
 
The role of strategic resources 
Successful undertaking of migration involves costs. In addition to transportation costs, a 
potential migrant incurs diverse other costs both at destination (e.g., an urban centre) and 
the place of origin (village home). Costs at destination include job search costs, costs of 
supporting oneself while in job search, emotional costs due to separation from family, and 
so forth. Further, when an adult male migrates, the family as well as the properties/assets 
left  behind  are  deprived  of  certain  amount  of  care  and  protection,  which  clearly  has 
imputed costs. The latter costs can be substantial in societies where property rights are 
poorly defined and/or enforced. The point is that migration costs may vary a great deal 
across households depending on households’ access to certain strategic resources, also 
known as social capital. A prime example of this is the membership in a family/kinship 
network. Below, we give examples of how the size and tightness of a network affects costs 
of migration. The care and protection for the family left behind by a migrating adult will be 
provided  by  other  family  members  at  a  minimal  cost  if  the  migrant  belongs  to  a 
large/extended family. Further, job search costs at destination are significantly lower for a 
migrant  who  has  family  members/kin  already  working  in  the  same  urban  destination, 
compared to a migrant who has no urban connections. Clearly, unequal access to social 
capital  may  explain  why  households,  that  are  otherwise  similar,  may  show  different 
incidence of seasonal migration. 
 
Our goal in this paper is to develop a framework for analyzing seasonal rural-to-urban 
migration that draws on the stylized facts/attributes (of migration) summarized above. To 
this end, we propose an inter-temporal, albeit, a two-period model of labour allocation 
decision of a peasant household, where the two periods are the two seasons in the crop 
cycle. The peak season allocation of labour is assumed to be trivial: the entire family works 
in the home/village labour market. The key decision problem is how to allocate family   6 
labour in the slack period between home-based (rural) activities and migration (i.e., urban 
activities), so as maximize the household inter-temporal utility. The main novelty of this 
work is in the results it yields. Two of the main results are as follows: 
·  For an individual household, undertaking seasonal migration may be worthwhile even 
if the expected slack season urban income is lower than the expected slack season rural 
income. This will obtain if the migration-induced benefit from income diversification 
outweighs the (negative) urban-rural wage differential. 
 
·  Participation in seasonal migration yields potential utility/welfare gains both directly 
and indirectly. First, a household with migrant members may be better off because it 
enjoys  higher  (risk  adjusted)  income  in  the  slack  season  relative  to  that  of  a 
comparable  rural  household  without  migrants.  This  we  call  the  direct  effect  of 
migration.  Additionally,  participation  in  (slack  season)  migration  may  yield  inter-
temporal spill-over benefits on the family welfare. It is shown below that participating 
households may in fact supply more labour in the peak season (relative to comparable 
non-participating  households)  yielding  higher  household  income  and  utility.  The 
mechanism is as follows. Note first that the slack season for peasant households is 
typically a period of deficit, in that income falls short of desired consumption. The 
expected deficit is generally met by savings from the (preceding) peak season. To the 
extent  that  slack  season  migration  leads  to  a  rise  in  the  risk-adjusted  (or  certainty 
equivalent) income, the corresponding expected deficit (and savings requirement) is 
reduced. This allows the household to increase its peak season nutritional intake and 
potentially supply more labour, thereby generating additional earnings and utility. The 
latter is defined the indirect effect of seasonal migration. The possibility of similar 
spill-over effects of migration has been alluded to in the literature, (see for example, 
Regmi  and  Tisdell  (2002)),  although  this  has  not  been  modelled.  Note  that  the 
assumption that is key in generating the positive labour supply response to migration is 
the positive relationship that exists (among the extreme poor) between one’s nutritional 
intake and one’s capacity f or physical work. 
 
The paper also takes up the issue of the possible market and distributional consequences of 
seasonal migration in the source region for migrants, i.e., the rural economy. There indeed 
exists a large literature on this issue, and interestingly, the opinion in the literature is highly   7 
divided.  Lipton  (1980)  and  Barham  and  Boucher  (1998),  among  others,  argue  that 
migration is likely to worsen income distribution in the source area. Stark et al. (1986) and 
Stark and Taylor (1991), among others, draw largely the opposite conclusion. There is 
however consensus that the divergence in opinion can be attributed to the differences in 
methodologies used, as well as the nature of the questions asked. The method used in this 
paper  is  inspired  by  the  work  of  Barham  and  Boucher  (op.  cit.).  Using  econometric 
techniques on data from Nicaragua, Barham and Boucher compare income distribution in 
the presence of migration with the counterfactual of no-migration. We construct here a 
similar counterfactual experiment, albeit using a simple simulation model. For tractability, 
we divide up the rural population in three groups: households with migrants, households 
without  migrants  and  land-owning  households.  The  simulation  exercise  yields  the 
following results. Migration depresses the peak season market wage (for rural labour). A 
lower wage has following consequences. The land-owning and migrant households are 
better off and the non-migrant households are worse-off, compared with the counterfactual 
of no migration.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The analytical model of household decision 
making is presented in section two along with the discussions of the results. Section three 
contains  discussions  of  the  numerical/simulation  results  on  the  income  distributional 
outcomes  of  seasonal  migration.  The  policy  implications  of  the  analyses  and  the 
conclusions and caveats are taken up in section four. 
 
2.1.   The Model 
We consider a rural economy over a crop cycle, with two seasons: a high/peak season 
(period 1) with a tight labour market, followed by a slack/low season (period 2) with low 
as well as uncertain labour demand. There are two types of rural households: large land-
owning households and landless peasant or worker households. Large households employ 
hired labour to produce certain staple. These households are not modelled explicitly. Our 
focus is on the labour supply behaviour of the peasant households. In the peak season 
(which is the harvesting period), a competitive labour market prevails, and all job seekers 
could  potentially  find  employment  at  a  given  market  wage.  Below,  we  make  two 
foundational assumptions about the peak season labour market.    8 
·  Following Dasgupta (1993) and others, we assume that an individual’s productivity (or 
the supply of effective effort) in the peak season is a function of his/her nutritional intake 
in that season, (see figure 2). That is, one’s nutritional status or innate strength is not a 
factor  in  determining  one’s  productivity  in  peak  season  activities.  Note  that  the 
assumption is only relevant for individual job-seekers who are assetless and rely entirely 
on labour income for sustenance. Note further that this individual level relationship is 
assumed to be also valid at the family level. 
·  The market operates on a piece rate basis, that is, wages are based on productivity. 
 
While the validity of the first of these assumptions (in similar contexts) has been criticized in 
the  literature,  we  provide  the  following  justification  for  their  inclusion.  Sukhatme  and 
Margen (1982), Payne (1992), Srinivasan (1994) and others argue that a person’s physical 
efficiency adjusts over time to alterations in nutritional intake. That is, there is no unique 
relationship between calorie-intake and productivity. Empirical evidence from rural India 
however show that a strong (i.e., statistically significant) nutrition-productivity relationship 
does  exist  for  certain  key  agricultural  activities,  such  as  harvesting,  which  requires 
sustained energy expenditure. For other activities, such as ploughing which requires innate 
strength,  the  relationship  is  a  weaker  one;  see  among  others,  Behrman  and  Deolalikar 
(1988) and Strauss (1986), for details. We point out that harvesting is the main peak season 
activity  and  is  largely  performed  by  casual  workers.  Further,  as  argued  by  Dasgupta 
(1993), Dasgupta and Ray (1986) and others, this assumption guarantees that the concept 
of poverty indeed has a functional role in the analysis. 
 
The plausibility of the second assumption – that piece wages can be (and are) implemented 
in spot markets – depends on whether an individual worker’s productivity is observable. 
Note that while labour productivity may not be observable without monitoring in certain 
activities, e.g., ploughing, it is certainly observable in harvesting. This largely concurs with 
the empirical observation that the peak season market is dominated by casual workers 
where piece rates are common, see among others, Behrman and Deolalikar (1988). This 
concludes our defence as to why the two assumptions above should indeed be part of this 
model. 
   9 
The slack  season (which  follows the peak season) is a  period  of relative inactivity. The 
agricultural  labour  market  does  not  operate  in  the  standard  sense.  We  assume  that  job 
opportunities (of fixed duration and fixed remuneration) crop up only sporadically and job-
matching takes place randomly
6. The consumption-effort relation is assumed not to play any 
role in the slack period labour allocation. The reason is that since a given amount of work (or 
a  given  number  of  tasks)  are  allocated  randomly  among  potential  workers,  individual 
workers/households can not affect their own probabilities of getting a job (or the amount of 
effort to be supplied if they get a job) by varying the level of consumption. That is, the slack 
season household income in the absence of migration is exogenous random variable, and is 
assumed to be given by a two parameter (mean-variance) distribution. The average slack 
season family income is also typically less than the household’s subsistence requirement. If 
migration possibilities open up, the households will be free to allocate its labour resources 
between two markets in the slack season. The income stream from urban employment is also 
assumed to be uncertain and is described by a given mean-variance distribution, similar to the 
slack season rural income. The act of migration involves certain expenditures (as discussed 
earlier). These expenditures/costs are family specific and are assumed to have a fixed and a 
variable  component.  The  fixed  component  includes,  for  example,  costs  of  information 
gathering about urban job market (-a part of search cost).  The variable component, (e.g., 
travel costs, urban living expenses, etc.), is assumed to be a linear function of the proportion 












                                                 
6 Workers, in addition, have access to some non-market opportunities (e.g., self-employment) in the slack season, 
which yield very small returns.   10 
The main assumptions of the model are presented in the following table. 
High/peak season (period 1)  Low season (period 2) 
No uncertainty.  Employment income in the rural sector 
( R y ) is uncertain. 
 
There exists a given piece rate wage, w. 
) 2 , ( : ~
R R y N R y s , 
   2
R s : variance of rural income       
Household income is y w Im 1 = . ,where 
Im: productive effort.   
Employment income (yu) in the urban  
informal sector (in the case of migration) is 
given by,                                                                                                        
~ : ( , ) yu N yu u s 2 . 
s u
2 : variance of urban income. 
Effort  supply  (Im)  is  a  function 
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Migration costs (household i):  a q q i i 2 1 + . 
a : Proportion of family labour allocated to             
the urban market. 
    and   2 1 i i q q are, respectively, fixed and 
marginal cost of migration. Subscript i 




Figure 2  
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                                                        0    c1                     Period 1 consumption (c1) 
 
According  to  Figure  2,  the  household  does  not  produce  any  effective  effort  up  to 
consumption level  c1.  c1 is often defined as the Resting Metabolic Rate (see Dasgupta 
(1993)). Effort is a concave function of consumption thereafter. 
 
 
                                                 
7 This representation of consumption-effort function is due to Dasgupta (1993).   11 
2.2.  The decision problem of a representative household 
The  representative  household  is  assumed  to  maximize  expected  utility  defined  as  a 
function  of  consumption  and  effort  supply,  over  a  two  period  decision  horizon.  The 
household operates as a single decision making unit. That is, possible conflict between 
individual  well-being  and  group  welfare  is  assumed  away
8.  We  assume  further  that 
migration takes place only in the slack season, and that, migrants always return home to 
the rural labour market in the peak season
9. For a household to contemplate migration, it 
must hold that the expected utility from undertaking migration is at least as large as the 
expected utility in the absence of migration. In order to obtain the “marginal conditions” 
under which  migration is welfare improving,  we need to incorporate in the  model the 
optimal  expected  utility  in  the  absence  of  migration  as  a  constraint.  The  modelling  is 
therefore done in two stages. First, we model family labour allocation in the absence of 
migration. This is followed by the full model. 
 
Allocation in the absence of Migration 
The maximization problem (in the absence of migration) is defined as follows: 




2 1 c EU I c U I c c EU m m d + = , subject to  ), ( 1 c Im e £   
where  
2 1   and   EU U  are utility for period 1 and expected utility for period 2 
 respectively, 
1 c : consumption in period 1, 
2
~ c : consumption (stochastic) in period 2 = ) ( ~ ) ( ~
1 1 1 c wI y c y y m R R - + = - + , and  
d  is the subjective discount rate. 
 
In the beginning of period 1, households make simultaneous decision on how much effort 
to supply (Im) and how much to consume in period 1 (c1). Period 2 effort supply, as 
explained earlier, is not a decision variable. For the purpose of illustration we assume the 
following negative exponential utility
10: 
                                                 
8 The assumption that households in developing countries operate as a unit in making migration decisions has 
been made by Chen et al. (2003).  
9 The latter assumption clearly lacks realism. That is, return migration cannot be an optimal strategy if the 
household stands to be better off by having some members staying permanently in the city. However, we do 
not attempt to model the coexistence of seasonal and more permanent form of migration in order to keep 
matters simple. We leave this as a topic for future research.  
 
10 Chen et al. (2003) assume similar utility specification in their model of household migration decisions.   12 
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A c s : certainty equivalent consumption for the slack season
11, 
  c2 ￿  ) 1 ( c m wI R y - + : mean slack season consumption, and 
  variance( 2
~ c ) ￿ variance( R y ~ ) ￿ 
2
R s . 
 
The utility specification for period 1 follows that of Eswaran and Kotwal (1985). In a 
single  period  context,  this  specification implies,  assuming  consumption  equals  income, 
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where “Max.” stands for maximum possible effort supply, and g has the interpreted  
of the “reservation wage”.  
In the present context, maximum effort supply is attained where effort supply constraint 
binds.  We  indeed  assume  that  effort  supply constraint always  binds.  This  we  argue  is 
reasonable  given  that  the  “reservation  wage”  (g )  for  the  very  poor  is  expected  to  be 
always smaller   than the prevailing market wage, (i.e., the very poor will not be voluntarily 
unemployed).  
   
Rewriting the maximization problem as a Lagrange function: 
  ￿ ￿
￿
￿ ￿
￿ - + + = } ) 1 ( { )} 2 ( ) , 1 ( { } , , 1 { .
2 1
m I c c U m I c U
m I c
Max L Max CE e l d l  
The first order conditions, (given that the effort supply constraint binds, i.e.,  0 > l ), are: 
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11 This follows derivation in Laffont (1993), chapter 2, pages 19-22.   13 
or,  ) 2 ( ) 1 ( 2 1
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c Im = ￿ = 0 1 ( )                  (3) 
First,  by  substituting  (2)  into  (1),  and  then  using  (3)  and  the  definition  of  the  utility 
functions (i.e., negative exponential utilities), we can reduce the first order conditions to a 
single equation
12: 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] (4.1)                                                                ) ( 1 ) 2 ( ) ( 1 ) , (   or,
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Equation (4.1) gives the condition for the optimal allocation of consumption between the 
two periods. That is, at the optimum no possible reallocation of consumption between 
periods  will  yield  utility  gains.  This  can  also  be  expressed  as  the  marginal  rate  of 
substitution in consumption between the two periods, (with the second period consumption 
expressed in terms of certainty equivalent)
13: 
  [ ]
[ ] ) ( 1

















e d ¢ -
¢ - =  (< 1)        (4.2) 
Equation (4.2) has the following interpretation. The optimal allocation of consumption 
between the two periods is uneven - a higher consumption is preferred in the peak/first 
period.  This  is  so  for  two  reasons:  First,  agents  are  impatience,  so  they  prefer  higher 
consumption in the first period – (note that the discount factor, d <1, can be interpreted as 
the rate of impatience). Second, higher period 1 consumption is preferred, (independent of 
the  impatience  factor  (d)),  because  it  increases  one’s  productivity  in  that  period.  The 
second period consumption has no such productivity enhancing effect. This follows from 
                                                 
12 Given that the effort supply constraint always binds, the optimization problem reduces to a problem with 
only one unknown,  1 c . That is, the optimal level of  1 c uniquely determines the levels of effort supply,  Im , 
and period 2 consumption. 
13 Note that the term ‘second period consumption’ or ‘slack season consumption’ will, from here-onward, 
refer to the ‘certainty equivalent consumption’ in that period/season.     14 
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¢ - <1, since w>g  (by assumption)
14. Below we give a numerical example of the 
solution to the household allocation problem.  
 
Numerical Example 1 
We rewrite first (4.2): 
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The utility functions for periods 1 and 2, as define earlier, are: 
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We  choose,  in  addition,  the  following  functional  form  for  the  consumption-effort 
relationship: 
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= = ) ( 1 f ,  m I >0. 
The function  ) ( m I f is often referred to as the food/consumption requirement function, (see 
for example, Stiglitz (1976)). Given the choice of functional forms, an analytical solution 
for consumption allocation does not exist. We therefore look for a numerical solution. The 
following parameter values are chosen: 
                                                 
14 Note that the term  ) 1 (c we¢ represents the value of increased work capacity/productivity due to a marginal 
increase in period 1 consumption, evaluated at the market wage. The term ( ) 1 c ge¢ , (with a negative sign in 
front), represents (a measure of) disutility from a marginal increase in effort supply. Further, note that both 
[1 ( )] and [1 ( )] 1 1 c w c ge e ¢ ¢ - -  are positive. These are in fact “weights” assigned to marginal utilities in order 
to find net change in utility due to incremental consumption. A negative weight would mean net marginal 
utility is negative from incremental consumption, which is not compatible with optimality conditions for 
utility maximization.   15 
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This yields the following solution
15: 
Period 1 consumption, 
*
1 c =25.91 
Period 1 effort supply,  = =
* *
1) ( m I c e ) 3 *
1 4 ln( - c =4.6115 
Period 1 savings,  982 . 10 91 . 25 ) 6115 . 4 ( 8 *
1
* = - = - c m wI  
 
Period 2 consumption (“certainty equivalent”),  *
2




* ( R c m wI R y s - - +  
                 = 15+(10.982) −10=15.982. 




                                                   
       Food Requirement Function                            Allocation in Pre-migration State 
   Panel I (Figure 3)                Panel II (Figure 3) 
                                                 
15 The numerical solution routine in Scientific Workplace 5.0 (MacKichan Software Inc. USA) is used in all 
computations below. 
16 This and all subsequent figures are generated by Scientific Workplace 5.0.   16 
Panel I of Figure 3 shows the food requirement function,  4




m I c f . In Panel II, 
this function is redrawn but now added onto a horizontal line with the height equalling the 
optimal savings from period 1 income, 
*
1
* c m wI - . The optimal household effort supply is 





Here, we look at the effect of a change in (i) the exogenous wage rate (w) and (ii) the 
variance  of  slack  season  income  (
2
R s )  on  the  optimal  intertemporal  consumption  and 
savings allocation. The above two (comparative statics) are representative of all possible 
comparative statics that can be meaningfully defined for the present problem. 
 
(i)  An  increase  in  period  1  wage  rate  will  unambiguously  increase  period  1 
consumption,  1 c , and labour supply, Im;  0
*
1 > dw
dc  and  0
*
> dw
dIm . The intuition is simple. 
Suppose that an increase in wage (w) does not lead to a corresponding change in period 1 
consumption. That must imply that the entire increase in income is saved and spent on 
period 2 consumption. This causes the right-hand side of the first order condition in (4.1) 
to drop with no corresponding change on the left-hand side, violating (4.1). In other words, 
there are utility gains to be had by reallocating consumption from period 2 to period 1. 
That is, the supposition above does not hold. Therefore, period 1 consumption must rise, 
(and along with it, period 1 labour supply (
*
m I )).  
 
The effect of wage on the period 1 savings (and therefore, on period two consumption) is 
however ambiguous: 









The intuition here is as follows. Once again, the first order condition implies that higher 
period 1 income should generally lead to higher consumption in both periods. However, 
                                                 
17 The derivation of the comparative static results is presented in the Appendix. Below, we present the 
intuition behind the results.   17 
there  is  a  special  case.  It  is  conceivable  that  if  the  productivity  gains  from  higher 
consumption (in period 1) are very large, then it may turn out to be worthwhile to lower 
period  1  savings  in  order  to  raise  period  1  consumption  to  a  level  that  will  generate 
maximum productivity gains. Lower period 1 savings imply lower period 2 consumption. 
 
(ii) A decline in 
2
R s  raises the certainty equivalent income for period 2. Optimality requires 
that this raise consumption in both periods. This can be easily demonstrated using similar 
argument as in (i) above. Further, an increase in period 1 consumption, in the present case, 
can only come about through lower period 1 savings. That is: 



















* c wIm - ) is the optimal period 1 savings. 
Below,  we  extend  the  household  decision  making  problem  to  allow  for  slack  season 
migration.  
 
2.3.  Allocation under migration 
For  a  household  to  contemplate  migration,  it  must  hold  that  the  expected  utility  from 
undertaking migration is at least as large as the expected utility in the absence of migration. 
In  order  to  obtain  the  “minimum  requirements/conditions”  under  which  migration  is 
welfare improving, we consider first the household decision problem in which the expected 
pre-migration utility enters as a constraint. The key decision here is how to optimally 
allocate family labour between the two labour markets in the slack season.  
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a : the proportion of total family labour allocated to the urban labour market.   18 
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The first order conditions are given by: 
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Substituting for l1from (7) into (6), one obtains upon some simple manipulation: 



















¢ - =                                              (11) 
Note that the marginal rate of substitution in consumption between the two periods given 
in (11) is identical with that in (4.2). This implies that if the household pre-migration 
expected  utility  is  equal  to  the  post  migration  expected  utility,  then  the  ex  ante 
consumption allocation between the two periods will also be identical in the pre- and post 
migration regimes. That is, 




post c pre c =               (12a) 




post CE c pre CE c =             (12b) 
  pre: pre-migration,  post: post migration. 
 
According to (12a), period 1 (peak period) consumption is identical in the pre- and post 
migration states. This further implies that the household peak season labour supply will 
also be identical in the two states. (12b) yields the following:  
   19 












post CE c A post c R A pre c pre CE c = - = - = s s . 
  It follows that if  ) (
2
) (
2   2 2 post c pre c then R ³ ³s s . 
That  is,  given  that  migration  results  in  some  diversification  of  risk,  the  expected 
second/slack period consumption will be lower in the state with migration than without. 
With the above as a backdrop, we address the following questions: 
(i)  What is the minimum required urban income that will induce households to 
participate in migration? 
(ii)  How would the peak season household labour supply respond to a (welfare 
improving) participation in migration? 
 
The minimum required urban income 
We begin with the following relationship from above: 
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*
u y  is the required (average) minimum urban income. That is, for any  u y > *
u y , migration 
will be welfare improving. Note further that  *
u y < R y , if  ) ( 2
2 2 s s a - R
A > ) ( 2
1 q a
q + . That is, if 
the benefits from risk reduction, (
2 2 s s - R ), are sufficiently large, then one can show that 
migration  may  be  desirable  even  if  the  income  of  the  urban  migrants  falls  short  of 
comparable rural income. An example of this is given below, (see numerical example 2). 
Similar results were also obtained by Levhari and Stark (1982) and Chen et al. (2003). 
 
Labour supply response to participation in migration 
It follows from above that peasant households will be indifferent between participation (in 
migration) and no-participation at  u y = *
u y , where  *
u y  is defined in (12). Consider now a 
household that participate in migration at  u y = *
u y . How would the household respond (in 
terms of the allocation of consumption and effort) to a marginal increase in  u y  from the   20 
level  *
u y , with everything else the same? We answer this first intuitively, followed by an 
analytical demonstration. 
 
The effect of a higher  u y is in fact analogous to that of a decline in 
2
R s  as discussed above 
under comparative static exercises. The discussion is briefly repeated. Assume for the time 
being that the household does not adjust a  as a response to a change in u y  - this will be 
relaxed later. Consider first the slack/low season. An increase in  u y raises the slack season 
certainly equivalent income. Optimality requires that this lead to higher consumption in 
both periods. Note however that higher consumption in period 1 can only be achieved 
through lower savings (in that period). Higher peak season (or period 1) consumption, in 
turn, enables the household to supply more labour and therefore earn more and potentially 
consume  more  in  both  periods  in  equilibrium.  Let  us  now  relax  the  assumption  of  a 
constant a . Given that a  affects utility/allocation only via its impact on the slack season 
income, a rational household will adjust a  from its initial equilibrium value (following an 
increase in  u y ) only if this raises the slack season income even further. Therefore, an 
increase in u y will unambiguously increase the household peak season labour supply. In 
order to verify this analytically, the following steps are necessary. First, we need to solve 
the household allocation problem without imposing the pre-migration utility constraint. We 
then evaluate 
u y d
dIm  via comparative-static exercise on the new solution. It follows trivially 
that  the  equations  (6),  (7),  (8)  and  (10)  are  the  relevant  first  order  conditions  for  the 
unconstrained problem, (with equation (9) omitted). Note that equation (11) is valid for the 
unconstrained problem, (but not equation (12)). 
 
The  evaluation  of 
u y d
dIm follows  similarly  as  the  earlier  comparative  statics:
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Below, we give numerical illustration of the above two results by extending Numerical 
Example 1.  
 
Numerical Example 2. 
(i)  First, we numerically evaluate the “minimum required urban income” for a given 
set of parameter values. 
We begin with relationship (12): 
) (
2







- - + + = R
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s a s a s a a s 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 = + - + - u R uR ( ) . ( ) , and  
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s s q a
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We  keep  the  parameter  values  from  the  pre-migration  model,  (Numerical  Example  1), 
unchanged. We assume the following values for the additional parameters that belong only 
to the post migration model:  
. 0    and    20    , 2    , 8 . 1
2 2
2 1 = = = = uR u s s q q  
Solving  (12)  numerically  with  the  above  parameter  values  gives  9
* = u y .  That  is,  an 
average slack period urban earning,  u y >9, will induce participation in migration. Note that 
the  corresponding  value  for  slack  season  rural  income,  R y   =  15  >  9  (= u y ).  This 
demonstrates that an urban earnings prospect that is substantially inferior to comparable 
rural prospect can still induce rural-to-urban migration.  
 
(ii)  It  is  shown  below  that  an  exogenous  increase  in  the  slack  season  mean  urban 
earning ( u y ) will cause household consumption to increase in both peak and slack periods. 
This, following the consumption-productivity relationship, induces households to supply   22 
more labour in the peak season. Note that given the values of parameters as in (i) above 
and  u y =9, the optimal allocation of consumption ( CE c c 2 1   and   ) and period 1 labour supply 
( m I ) in both pre- and post migration scenarios are identical. We show numerically how the 
optimal allocation changes as a response to an increase in  u y from 9 to 14.  
 
By substituting the parameter values in the first order condition for the household post 
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The above yields the following solution: 
Period 1 consumption, 
*
1 c =27.026 
Period 1 effort supply,  = =
* *
1) ( m I c e ) 3 *
1 4 ln( - c =4.655 
Period 1 savings,  214 . 10 293 . 27 ) 6651 . 4 ( 8 *
1
* = - = - c m wI  
Period 2 consumption (“certainty equivalent”),  
)) 2 )
40
23 ( * 10 2 )
40
17 ( * 10 ( )
40




17 (( 2 + - + - - - + + = CE c
         =17.026. 
Figure 4 depicts two separate migration equilibria: one with  u y =9 (“before”) and the other 
with  u y =14 (“after”) – all other parameters are held constant.    23 
              Figure 4 
                              
                        
The vertical line segment labelled “savings, after” shows the optimal savings with  u y =14. 
Note that this is lower than the optimal savings with  u y =9, shown by the line segment 
“savings, before”, (which is same as the pre-migration savings in example 1). The figure 
also  shows  both  optimal  consumption  and  labour  supply  for  the  two  values  of  u y .  In 
particular,  it  shows  that  the  peak  season  labour  supply  increases  as  a  response  to  an 
expected increase in the slack season urban income. 
 
To summarize the main results, we show that if a household finds itself better-off as a 
result of participating in seasonal migration compared to the initial state of no-migration, 
then  household  consumption  in  both  periods  must  increase  in  the  post  migration 
equilibrium. Increased period 1 consumption also yields, via the consumption-productivity 
function,  higher  period  1  labour  supply.  This  does  not  necessarily  require  that  urban 
income opportunities are better that the rural ones. In fact, the diversification benefits alone 
may make migration worthwhile even if urban income opportunities are inferior to rural 
opportunities.  
 
3.  Market analysis 
The analysis thus far has been partial equilibrium in nature. It is, at this juncture, natural to 
raise the following question:    24 
What are the economy-wide of effects seasonal migration, both in terms of labour 
market and distributional outcomes? 
In  order  to  address  this,  we  construct  a  simple  model  of  the  rural  labour  market  by 
extending the household model, and then perform numerical simulations of the following 
type. We assume that the rural economy initially is at a pre-migration equilibrium (- the 
counterfactual  state  -)  and  then  trace  out  how  the  equilibrium  market  outcomes,  (e.g., 
market wage), are affected by the introduction of migration possibilities via a positive 
exogenous shock, e.g., an increase in  u y  or 
2
R s  or decline in 
2
u s . We also perform welfare 
comparisons of the two alternative market equilibria: one in the presence of migration and 
one without. We should emphasize that we look for welfare effects of migration that comes 
about exclusively through the labour market, i.e., changes in wage. That is, we abstract 
from all other possible price/output effects (of migration). 
 
First, we discuss the set-up and workings of the simulation model and the intuition behind 
the results it produces. Recall our earlier assumption that there are predominantly two 
types  of  rural  households:  Large  land-owning  (non-worker)  households  and  landless 
peasant/worker households. Only the peasant households contemplate migration. Further, it 
is assumed that only those owning strategic resources among the peasant households are 
able  to  successfully  participate  in  migration.  Let  us  now  assume  that  each  of  the  two 
groups  of  peasant  households,  (those  with  strategic  resources  and  those  without),  is 
homogeneous (within the group). It follows from the partial equilibrium analysis above 
that with the pre-migration equilibrium as a starting point, the act of migration by one 
group of households, induced by (say) an exogenous rise in expected urban income, will 
cause the aggregate peak season labour supply of this group to increase. The labour supply 
of the other group - (that without strategic resources) - remains unchanged. This leads to an 
increase in the aggregate labour supply. This will depress the equilibrium peak season 
wage. How would this affect the well-being of the representative households from the three 
different  groups  in  the  post  migration  equilibrium?  Consider  first  the  land-owners
18. 
Assume that landlords maximize (utility of) profits from production (of a staple) using 
pleasant labour, land and other inputs. Everything else the same, a lower wage means that 
the landlords will hire more labour and enjoy higher profit/returns and therefore will be 
                                                 
18 The following conclusion about the land-owning households is ad-hoc. Note that these households are not 
formally modeled in this paper.   25 
unambiguously better-off. What about the peasant households without migrants? These 
households are unambiguously worse-off as a decline in the peak season wage will lead to 
lower  effort  supply  and  lower  income  in  the  peak  season.  The  utility  loss  for  these 
households can be easily demonstrated by using the comparative-static results in section 
2.2. The peasant households with migrants, on the other hand, will be better-off despite a 
fall in wage. The intuition is as follows. Suppose first to the contrary, i.e., household utility 
declines as the equilibrium peak wage drops. This supposition, we argue, cannot hold if we 
allow the households to be “dynamically rational”, meaning that the households recognize 
their worsening well-being to be a consequence of their own action, (namely, supplying 
more labour). All that the households need to do to avoid being worse off is to consume all 
income gains from migration in the second period. This leaves period one consumption and 
labour  supply  unaffected,  but  household  utility  increases  due  to  higher  period  two 
consumption. One can then conclude that should the equilibrium wage fall, this must also 
accompany utility gains for these households. The above utility comparisons of peasant 
households are demonstrated below via a numerical example. 
 
Numerical Example 3:   A model of the rural sector 
Recall that the rural economy has three population groups: Landlords, peasant households 
with (potential) migrants and peasant households without migrants.  
 
Aggregate demand for labour 
(Inverse) demand for labour aggregated over all landlords is assumed to be given by: 
Wage (w) = 44. 892 – (Aggregate labour effort)/50 
 
Migration costs 
It is further assumed that there are 400 peasant households; 200 in each of the two groups. 
Peasant households have the following migration cost function: 
Migration costs =  1 2 q q a + =
( )  1.8 2  (for households with strategic resources)









The two groups of peasant households only differ in terms of fixed cost of migration. All 
households are otherwise endowed with the same utility- and consumption-effort function 
as defined in the numerical examples 1 or 2. 
   26 
Derivation of aggregate effort supply  
Pre-migration period: 
We derive first the pre-migration effort supply. The market data, (i.e., the parameters and 
the exogenous variables) are as follows: 
2 2 15,   9,    20,  20 and  0 R u R R uR y y s s s = = = = = . 
The definition of pre-migration period in the present context is as follows. Given the above 
parameters,  no  household  will  find  it  worthwhile  participating  in  migration
19.  All 
households will allocate consumption and effort according to the following rule, (- same as 
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c c e , 
where    1 c : period 1 consumption 
    Period 1 effort supply: m I = 1 ln(4 3) c -  
    w: prevailing market wage in period 1 
 
For a given value of wage, the above equation generates optimal values for consumption 
and effort supply. We generate household effort supply (i.e., points on the supply curve) 
for different possible wages between 4 and 10 with intervals of 0.5. Each of these values is 
multiplied by 400 to obtain an aggregate supply for the rural economy. This is drawn in 
Figure 5.  
 
Post migration period: 
We introduce now the following (positive) exogenous shock: The expected slack period 
urban income rises to 14. Note that this is still smaller than the comparable rural income, 
15 = R y .  This  leads  to  participation in  migration  among  only  the  low  (migration) cost 
households.  The  high  (migration)  cost  households  will  still  not  find  participation 
worthwhile. We generate effort supply for both household types for the same range of 
wage (4, 10) with intervals of 0.5. Household effort supply for each group is multiplied by 
                                                 
19 In fact, the household group with lower fixed cost of migration will be indifferent between participation in 
migration and no-participation. However, this is of no consequence since their consumption and effort supply 
remain unchanged whether they participate or not.   27 
200  and  added  up  to  obtain  the  aggregate/market  supply  of  effort  in  the  presence  of 
migration. This is also drawn in Figure 5. The market equilibrium is as follows: 
Pre-migration equilibrium:  w = 8     and       effort supply = 1844.6 




                          
Post migration market outcome 
 
The household intertemporal consumption and utility levels in the two equilibria are as 
follows: 
Pre-migration equilibrium ( 15   , 8 = = R y w ) 
 
  Household consumption         Utility 
   (All peasant households)     
) .
( 2 ) 1
) 2














   
 
      Period 1 ( 1 c )             Period 2   (
CE c2 )             
          25.91                 15.982         
7 10 3298 . 1 - ´ -  
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Post migration equilibrium ( 14   , 15   , 9085 . 7 = = = u R y y w ) 
 
      Household consumption         Utility 
                            
) .
( 2 ) 1
) 2














        Period 1 ( 1 c )     Period 2 (
CE c2 ) 
     
Peasant households with low migration costs: 
        26.762                    16.784       
8 10 0059 . 6
- ´ -  
             
  Peasant households with high migration costs: 
     25.647           15.74       
7 10 6939 . 1
- ´ -  
 
 
The  utility  figures  show  that  the  households  with  migrants  are  better-off 
(
8 10 0059 . 6
- ´ - >
7 10 3298 . 1
- ´ - )  and  the  households  without  migrants  are  worse-off 
(
7 10 6939 . 1
- ´ - <
7 10 3298 . 1
- ´ - ) respectively in the post migration equilibrium relative to 
the pre-migration equilibrium
20.    
             
 
 4.  Conclusions 
This paper develops a theoretical framework – albeit, one that is largely illustrative - for 
studying seasonal migration in poor rural economies. While the methodological approach 
adopted  is  micro-theoretic,  the  framework  also  allows  for  simple  analyses  at  the 
aggregate/market level. At the micro-level, the model derives a number of results regarding 
how  household  behaviour  is  intertemporally  affected  due  to  participation  in  seasonal 
migration. In particular, the model shows that participation in slack season migration may 
encourage  poor  households  to  supply  more  labour  in  the  peak  season.  As  to  the 
market/macro effects of migration, the results show that while the land-owning households 
and  the  peasant  households  with  migrants  are  better  off,  the  non-participating  peasant 
households, (or, in the present context, those lacking access to strategic resources), are 
                                                 
20  We  do  not  try  to  derive  any  exact  measure  of  income  inequality  in  order  to  do  a  before  and  after 
comparison, (for example, through formally defining some inequality index) for that will require that the 
model is given additional structure, but more importantly, it is unclear how informative such an exercise 
would be given the level of abstraction of the model. This should also be borne in mind while considering 
policy options below.   29 
worse off in the post migration equilibrium. In other words, the poorest and the  most 




Recall that the point of departure for this essay has been the query as to how rural poor 
may use seasonal migration as an effective tool for risk-coping. The conclusions drawn 
above  suggest  that  some  of  the  poor  (“the  non-participating  households”)  are  doubly 
cursed: they remain exposed to the slack season income risks as they lack the means to 
participate in migration, and further, they experience a fall in potential wage income in the 
peak season as the market wage drops due participation in migration by others.  
 
As  to  the  issue  of  policy,  the  discussion  above  naturally  leads  us  to  the  following 
conclusion: The acute poor need to be provided with alternative means of coping income 
risks. That is, there appears to be a clear role for public intervention. In fact, there are a 
number of public poverty alleviation measures, currently being practiced world-wide (see 
Ravallion (2006) for details), that can adequately serve as a means of risk-coping. Some 
examples are given below. 
·  Public transfer programs 
·  Work-fare programs (e.g., food-for-work projects) 
·  Micro-credit programs 
 
Recall again how participation in migration, according to our model, potentially improves 
household welfare: It raises the slack season certainly equivalent income. This, in turn, has 
spill-over effects on household peak period consumption and labour supply. All public 
transfers are comparable to an increase in slack season certainly equivalent income. One of 
the  difficulties  with  transfers  however  is  reaching  the  target  group,  i.e.,  the  targeting 
problem.  The  problem  of  identifying  the  target  group  and  keeping  the  non-poor  from 
abusing the program remains a problematic issue, see Ravallion (1990, 2006).  
 
                                                 
21 We should here add the caveat that in evaluating the welfare effects of migration, we consider only the 
effect of the equilibrium change in wage. A declining wage is likely to affect the output of staple positively 
leading  to  a  change  in  staple/food  prices.  If  the  price  of  staple  declines,  this  will  affect  all  households 
positively. A before and after welfare comparison with price and output effects is however beyond the scope 
of the present framework.    30 
Slack season work-fare programs in rural areas directed towards unemployed peasants 
have clear risk-coping functions. Public works programs are also popular among policy 
makers  as  these  possess  a  number  of  desirable  properties:  While  designed  as  poverty 
measures,  works  programs  also  contribute  by  creating  rural  infrastructure  investments. 
Additionally, works programs, if properly designed, can be self-targeting. By self-targeting 
one refers to a program design that leads to the poor self-selecting (into the program) while 
the  non-poor  staying  away.  Such  a  design  could  be,  for  example,  to  keep 
wages/remuneration for participants sufficiently low, (i.e., lower than the reservation wage 
of the non-poor, if that is known).  
 
Access to credit via micro-credit institutions can also function as a means of risk coping by 
allowing poor to engage in self-employment activities during the slack season. There is 
however evidence that the acute poor are not always the most efficient utilizers of credit, 
and that they may still have to rely on complementary public policies, e.g., public transfers 
of one kind or another, in order to protect themselves from income risks, (see, for example 
Morduch (2000) and Zaman (1999)).  
 
While  the  above  antipoverty  measures  have  been  practiced  worldwide  and  have  gone 
through  much  scrutiny  as  to  their  effectiveness,  the  arguments  articulated  above 
nonetheless provide additional reasons for their desirability.    31 
Appendix 
Derivation of comparative static results: 














We start with the first order condition for utility maximazation given in (4.2): 
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First, we evaluate the left-hand side derivative: 
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This establishes the claim made above.   32 
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¢ - = , and collecting terms in the above, we get the 
following: 
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Taking the left-hand side derivative, we get 
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This establishes the claim.   33 
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